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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impacts of institutional quality and busi-
ness environment on Chinese foreign direct investment (F.D.I.)
flow to Africa. We derive aggregate indicators of institutional
quality and business environment using economic and govern-
ance institutions, doing business, transport efficiency indicators
conducting a principal component analysis. We employ Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (P.P.M.L.) procedure to estimate the
gravity model of F.D.I. flow as it can solve zero-valued observa-
tions and heterogeneity problems. Our findings disclose that insti-
tutional quality and business environment indicators are
significant motivators of Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa. Our findings
are robust and similar after we account for endogeneity concerns
using an I.V. estimator. Based on our results, we conclude that
improvement in the business environment and the institutional
quality of African countries is key to spurring Chinese F.D.I. flow
to Africa.
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Chinese engagement in African countries is not a recent phenomenon. However, their
economic relation has experienced the fastest growth after the forum on the
China–Africa cooperation conference in Beijing in 2000. This Africa–China economic
tie has been mainly manifested by trade openness, Chinese foreign direct investment
(F.D.I.) flow and financial assistance for African countries. Chinese F.D.I. into
African countries has grown rapidly in recent years since the conference. For
example, Chinese F.D.I. stock in sub-Saharan African countries reached nearly US$24
billion in 2013, reflecting an annual growth rate of more than 50% between 2004 and
2013 (Copley, Maret-Rakotondrazaka & Sy 2014).
Furthermore, Chinese F.D.I. into Africa increased dramatically in 2016, registering
a 106% jump in projects (EY Africa, 2017). This rapid growth of Chinese F.D.I. in
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Africa is considered as one of the indicators of Africa’s development potential and
investment appeal and also points to the mutually beneficial nature of China–Africa
cooperation. The interesting thing about Chinese F.D.I. is its composition. It is more
diversified than the composition of other major countries that are investing in Africa.
It consists 19.5% in financial services sector, 16.4% in construction sector, 15.3% in
manufacturing, and the remaining 18.2% in business and tech services, geological
prospecting, wholesale retail, agriculture and real estate (Copley et al., 2014) and it is
also distributed in almost all African countries (Figure A1 in Appendix).
However, according to the existing empirical studies this diversified Chinese F.D.I.
inflow to African countries is claimed to be driven by natural resources, infrastruc-
ture sectors for export of natural resources and market size. For example, studies by
Adisu, Sharkey and Okoroafo (2010) reveal that Chinese F.D.I. inflow to African
countries is claimed to follow the state-driven strategy of giving infrastructure and
taking natural resources. In addition, a study by Cheung et al. (2011) suggests that
China’s investment in Africa is driven by the common traditional determinants con-
sidered in the literature on Chinese foreign investment to African countries. Hence
markets and resources seeking motives and economic risk factors are significant
determinants of China’s F.D.I. to Africa. Similarly, a study by Sanfilippo (2010)
implies that Chinese F.D.I. to Africa is pushed by the need to satisfy a growing
internal demand for natural resources and good market potential to place its low-cost
production. To our knowledge, no previous research studies have examined the
domestic investment environment and institutional quality as determinants of
Chinese F.D.I. to African countries.
Several pieces of empirical literature (Kapuria-Foreman, 2008; Anyanwu, 2012;
Buchanan, Le and Rishi, 2012; William, Agyapong and Abass, 2013) argue that insti-
tutional factors such as good governance, economic freedom, and a business-friendly
regulatory environment are the most important in investors’ decision-making are
becoming highly popular determinants of F.D.I. flow, indicating a shift from market
and resource seeking to efficiency-seeking motives to F.D.I. That is traditional F.D.I.
promoters such as natural resources and market size are relatively becoming less
important, while less traditional factors, such as business environment, institutional
quality and governance, and economic freedom are becoming major promoters of
F.D.I. flow. In addition, a study by Ali, Feiss and MacDonald (2010) shows that insti-
tutional quality more specifically economic institutions such as property right and
contract enforcement are robust factors to attract F.D.I. Similarly, an improvement in
doing business indicators (ease of doing business) is becoming one of the important
factors to attract more F.D.I. to developing countries (Bayraktar, 2015; Moran et al.,
2018). Therefore, empirical assessment of the drivers of Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries should take into account the business environment and institutional
quality on the top of the traditional determinants of F.D.I. flow.
Hence, the major aim of this article is to examine the impact of the domestic busi-
ness environment and institutional quality on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African coun-
tries. We match aggregate indicators of business environment and institutional
quality indicators (doing business, border and transport efficiency, economic freedom
and governance) of African countries with Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa. In addition,
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we examine the impact of major economic freedom indicators on Chinese F.D.I. flow
separately. Our results provide evidence that Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries
is significantly affected by the business environment and institutional quality.
This study is significant for a few reasons. First, it examines the role of business
environment and institutional quality on Chinese F.D.I. flow which is an under-
researched topic. Second, we employ Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (P.P.M.L.)
estimator that helps include zero-valued observations in the sample and robust
method of estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Finally, our results are
robust and have no evidence of endogeneity problem.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Part two discusses the literature
review. Part three explains the data and methodology of the study. Part four presents
the results and findings of the study. Part five provides results of robustness check
for endogeneity, and part six gives conclusions.
2. Literature review
Economic literature examining the drivers of F.D.I. flow have arisen aiming primarily
to pinpoint which factors F.D.I. recipients have to provide. Over the last several deca-
des, a consensus has emerged that donor interests and the recipient needs to shape the
F.D.I. flow among countries. Using the Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) trade model to explain
the motives behind investors who operate production chains abroad in 1960s and
internalization theory, which was introduced by Buckley and Casson in 1976, Dunning
developed O.L.I. paradigm. The O.L.I. paradigm consists of three sub-paradigms from
which one can analyse the reasons why firms engage in F.D.I.: Ownership (O),
Location (L), and Internalization (I). These determinants have categorised into three
types: market-seeking, resource-seeking, and efficiency-seeking (Dunning, 2000).
Furthermore, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) developed a theory that relates F.D.I.
to international trade. On the other hand, Nocke and Yeaple (2008) developed an
assignment theory to analyse the volume and composition of F.D.I.
Based on the above theories and motives of F.D.I. flow a number of empirical
studies have been conducted so far regarding the determinants of F.D.I. flow to dif-
ferent countries. For example, using Bayesian statistical techniques, Blonigen and
Piger (2011) selects from a large set of candidates from those variables most likely to
be determinants of F.D.I. find that cultural distance, per capita G.D.P., labour endow-
ments and trade are the major determinants of F.D.I. flow to developing countries.
However, the little support is found for trade openness, host-country business costs,
host-country infrastructure and institutions. Similarly, Abbas and Mosallamy (2016)
using a panel data model found that resources, market openness, human capital,
infrastructure and political stability are significant determinants of F.D.I. Likewise,
Richet (2019) reveals that countries with smaller market opportunities receive less dir-
ect investment.
Most of F.D.I. literature emphasis on tradition determinants of F.D.I flow.
However, recently, some empirical studies have been conducted on the impact of
institutional quality on cross countries F.D.I. flow. Kapuria-Foreman (2008) employs
cross-country growth regressions for a sample of developing countries to examine the
28 D. G. BOROJO AND J. YUSHI
effects of institutional quality more specifically the effect of economic institutions
such as enforcement of property rights, corruption and policy orientation factors
(openness) find that F.D.I. positively responds to changes in levels of economic free-
dom. Similarly, Ali et al. (2010) and Buchanan et al. (2012) examine the effect of
institutional quality on F.D.I. based on a panel data analysis found that the govern-
ance infrastructure has a positive effect on F.D.I. flows. Using corruption control, the
rule of law and regulatory quality Anyanwu (2012) reveals the prevalence of the rule
of law increases F.D.I. inflows to African countries. Bayraktar (2015) examines the
link between F.D.I. and business environment using ease of doing business indicators
shows that countries which have better records of doing business tend to attract
more F.D.I. In addition, Moussa, Çaha and Karag€oz (2016) investigate the impact of
economic freedom on F.D.I. inflows in both global and regional panel analysis con-
cerning 156 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states, sub-Saharan coun-
tries. Their results show a positive impact of economic freedom on F.D.I.
Most of the earlier studies on Chinese F.D.I. have been emphasising market size
and natural resources motives. Studies examining the association between Chinese
F.D.I. and the business environment and institutional quality of African countries are
limited. A study by Sanfilippo (2010) and Cheung et al. (2011) suggests that China’s
investment in Africa is driven by the common traditional determinants considered in
the literature on Chinese foreign investment to African countries. Thus, this study
aims to examine the impact of the business environment and institutional quality on
Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. The data
Our study covers Chinese F.D.I. flow to 44 African countries for the periods
2003–2014 based on data availability. The list and definition of variables and data
sources are given in the Appendix (Table A1). The countries included in the sample
are also listed in the Appendix (Table A3). Chinese F.D.I. to Africa used in this study
is compiled from U.N.C.T.A.D. bilateral F.D.I. statistics and China statistical yearbook
by Johns Hopkins S.A.I.S. China–Africa Research Institute from the year 2003 (China
Africa Research Initiative, 2017). Facts of the explanatory variables controlled in this
study are spelled out in the following part.
3.1.1. Political and governance index
The empirical analysis for this article utilises a political and governance institution
data set of governance indicators of worldwide governance indicators (W.G.I.),
namely: the rule of law, the absence of violence and instability, regulatory quality,
government effectiveness, voice and accountability and control of corruption. The
rule of law shows contract and property right protection and abilities of police and
court to enhance private rights. Political stability and absence of violence represents
the capacity of government in avoiding internal and external conflicts and ethnic ten-
sions and control of corruption indicates the position of countries in fighting against
corruption. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government
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to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sec-
tor development. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of
public and civil services, and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation. Voice and accountability
catches view of the degree to which citizens can take an interest in selecting their
government, the opportunity of free expression and association, and a free media.
Their values range from –2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better
institutions.
Using these indicators of institutional quality of African countries, we derive a sin-
gle composite index using principal component analysis. The eigenvalue of the first
principal component of institutional quality is greater than 1 (4.565> 1). However,
none of the other components have eigenvalues more than 1. Since the first compo-
nent explains 76% of the variation in the original variables, the study uses the eigen-
vectors of the first principal component (see Table A2 in Appendix). Furthermore,
we employ the polity variable to proxy the democracy level of African countries.
3.1.2. Border and transport efficiency indices
We add border and transport efficiency indicators into our analysis using six soft
transport and border efficiency indicators. These are the cost of export, cost of
import, time to export, time to import, documents to export and documents to
import. The cost of export and import measures the fees imposed on a 20-foot con-
tainer in U.S. dollars. It includes charges associated with completing the processes to
export or import the goods. Time to export and to import is measured by the time
recorded in calendar days. The time calculation for an export or import process starts
from the moment it is started and runs until it is completed. All documents required
per shipment to export or import goods are captured.
Using principal component analysis, we find two aggregate indicators of border
and transport efficiency index. The eigenvalues of the first two components of the
border and transport efficiency are 1.749, 3.799 and 1.369, explaining 63.3% and
22.8% of the total variance, respectively. Hence we include the first two principal
components of border and transport efficiency as the sum of the variances of the
individual components 87.1% (see Table A2 in Appendix). We hypothesise that there
should be a negative relationship between border and transport efficiency indicators
and Chinese F.D.I. flow because of the ease of cross border trading activities pro-
motes F.D.I. inflow (William et al., 2013).
3.1.3. Doing business index
We control for doing business index using four ease of doing business indicators of
world development indicators (W.D.I.) such as cost to start the business, cost to
enforce the contract, cost to register property right and minimum capital required to
start the business. The eigenvalues of the first two components of these indicators are
greater than 1 (1.749 and 1.058> 1). The first two principal components of doing
business have variance 1.749 and 1.058, explaining 44% and 26.5% of the total vari-
ance, respectively explaining 70% of the total variance (see Table A2 in Appendix).
We hypothesise that a better business environment promotes Chinese F.D.I. flow to
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Africa because countries with better records of doing business environment attract
more F.D.I. (Bayraktar, 2015).
3.1.4. Economic freedom indicators
Economic freedom indicator is used to proxy economic institutions of African coun-
tries (Pearson, Nyonna & Kim, 2012). We add property right, legal protection, regula-
tion, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, government size and investment
freedom. In all cases, the values of these indicators vary from 0 to 10, with higher
values corresponding to a better status. Our hypothesis is that there should be a posi-
tive association between economic freedom and Chinese F.D.I. flow because a higher
degree of economic freedom results in higher F.D.I. inflow (Pearson et al., 2012).
3.1.5. Other traditional determinants
Real G.D.P. per capita and population size: They are used to proxy market size.
Countries with a high level of per capita G.D.P. might attract less F.D.I. inflows
because it indicates a lower marginal product of capital (Arbatli, 2011). A country
with a big population size attracts more F.D.I. inflow (Peres, Ameer & Xu, 2018).
Distance: Is represented by the physical distance between African countries and
China. Chinese F.D.I. in Africa tends to be more concentrated in the East and South
African regions. Some of the reasons why East Africa stands out as a popular destin-
ation for these private Chinese investments maybe because of its relative closeness to
China (Chen, Dollar & Tang, 2015).
Real G.D.P. per capita of China: We include real G.D.P. per capita of China based
on the work of Blonigen and Piger (2011) that shows 99% inclusion probability of
origin countries’ real G.D.P. per capita.
Natural resources depletion: It is used to proxy the natural resources motives of
Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries based on Foster, William, Chuan and
Nataliya (2009) which associate Chinese F.D.I. flow to natural resources extraction.
Diplomatic relationship: it is represented by China’s voting alignment with African
countries in the U.N. General Assembly and a dummy of African countries on the
recognition of one-China policy (Zhang, Jiang & Zhou, 2014).
China–Africa trade: It is used to measure African countries’ trade intensity with
China following the works of Cheung et al. (2011) that used to proxy economic links
of China with African countries.
Inflation rate: It is used to represent the macroeconomic stability. Furthermore,
domestic credit is used as a proxy to access credit and financial market.
Debt to G.D.P. ratio: It is used to proxy creditworthiness. External debt will have a
negative effect on F.D.I., and increasing foreign debt will destroy foreign investors’
vision and create negative expectations of the future economy (Ostadi & Ashja, 2014).
3.2. Methods of analysis
The empirical analysis of this article is based on the gravity specification of panel
data. The estimation of the gravity model in the recent empirical literature is mostly
based on panel data (Bussiere, Fidrmuc & Schnatz, 2008; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson,
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 31
2011). The gravity specification developed by Tinbergen (1962) to analyse inter-
national trade flow is shown in Equation (1). Trade flow between countries is a func-
tion of the mass of the country of origin, the mass of the country of destination and
the physical distance between the two countries.
Tij ¼ vMbni Mbmj =DbZij (1)
where Tij is international flow from reporter i country to partner j country (trade,
F.D.I. and migration), Mi and Mj are the mass of the origin and destination countries
(G.D.P. per capita of countries, population and so on), Dij is a physical distance
between origin and destination countries. b and v represent parameters and constant,
respectively.
In gravity models, the issues of heteroscedasticity are significantly important. If the
error term is heteroskedastic, which is highly probable in practice, then the expected
value of the error term depends on one or more of the explanatory variables because
it includes the variance term. This violates the first assumption of O.L.S. and suggests
that the estimator may be biased and inconsistent. The presence of heteroscedasticity
under the assumption of a multiplicative error term in the original nonlinear gravity
model specification requires the adoption of P.P.M.L. (Santos Silva & Tenreyro,
2006). Furthermore, if there are zero-valued observations, using the log-linear method
to estimate the gravity model results in loss of information because transforming data
to logarithm form drops zero-valued observations potentially leading to sample selec-
tion bias, which has become an important issue in recent empirical work. The
approach followed by the large majority of empirical studies is to drop the pairs with
zero-valued observations from the data set and estimate the log-linear form by O.L.S.
In turn, dropping zero-valued observations reduces the efficiency of data and lead to
biased estimates (Gomez-Herrera, 2013). However, this procedure will lead to incon-
sistent estimators of the parameters of interest.
The best alternative method for estimating the gravity model to accommodate
zero-valued observation is the P.P.M.L. estimator. Thus, the ability of Poisson to
include zero observations naturally and without any additions to the basic model is
highly desirable. This estimator is generally well behaved even when the proportion
of zeros in the sample is considerable (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2011). Alternatively,
Prehn, Br€ummer and Glauben (2016) developed a random intercept P.P.M.L. model
to allow for the estimation of exporter and importer invariant variables in the estima-
tion. It is an ideal estimator for the gravity model if the sample size is large enough
and the sample has many origin and destination countries. However, this method is
ruled out in this study because the sample size is not large enough as that of trade
flow and we have only one origin and many destination countries in the sample
which do not allow us to estimate the effects of time-invariant characteristics of
the pair.
We extend the P.P.M.L. estimator to estimate the gravity model of F.D.I. flow
because there are some zero-valued observations and heterogeneity issues (Santos
Silva & Tenreyro, 2006; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 2011; Jacimovic, Mitrovic, Bjelic,
Tianping & Rajkovic, 2018). Thus, Equation (1) can be augmented to include
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traditional gravity variables, institutional quality and business environment indicators
in this study.
FDIcit ¼ b0 þ b1gdpcait þ b2UNVict þ b3exdeptit þ b4naturalit þ b5distwict þ b6gdpcct
þb7dipic þ b8chinatradeict þ b9popit þ b10inf it þ b11credit þ bnBEit þ eict
(2)
where FDIcit denotes F.D.I. from China to Africa, gdpca is real G.D.P. per capita,
U.N.V. is China’s voting alignment with African countries in the U.N. General
Assembly, exdept is debt G.D.P. ratio of African countries, natural is natural resour-
ces depletion rate of African countries, distw is distance between African countries
and China, gdpc is real G.D.P. per capita of China, dip is dummy variable 1 if
African country support one-China policy and 0 otherwise, chinatrade represents
trade openness between China and African countries, pop is the population size of
African countries, inf represents the inflation rate of African countries, cred is
credit to the private sector, BE represents the level of democracy, business environ-
ment and institutional quality indicators of African countries and eijt is stochas-
tic term.
Multilateral resistance term (M.R.T.), which is a function of exogenous variables, is
taken into account by employing the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) method1. STATA
13 is used to exercise the model.
The log-linear transformation of Equation (2) is:
FDIcit ¼ b0 þ b1 ln gdpcait þ b2UNVict þ b3 ln exdeptit
þ b4 ln naturalit þ b5 ln distwict þ b6 ln gdpcct
þ b7dipict þ b8 ln chinatradeict þ b9 ln popit þ b10 ln inf it
þ b11 ln credit þ bn lnBEit þ eict
(3)
4. Results and findings
In this section, we discuss the main findings of the study. Table 1 presents P.P.M.L.
estimation results for the impacts of the aggregate business environment and institu-
tional quality on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries.
The results in Table 1 reveal that the economic magnitude of African countries
represented by their real G.D.P. per capita has a positive effect on F.D.I. flow
from China to African countries. However, its effect is statistically insignificant
except in column (ii). Additionally, population size has a significantly positive
effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. This result indicates that an
increase in population size provides a large market for products and services pro-
duced by Chinese F.D.I. in local markets. It also provides the economy with a
large labour force. Hence, it suggests that Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa is associ-
ated with population size. The geographical distance between African countries
and China has a significant negative effect on F.D.I. flow indicating that physical
distance discourages flow of F.D.I. However, bilateral trade openness between
China and Africa has a robust positive effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 33
countries. Therefore, trade openness between China and African countries is one
of the major drivers of Chinese F.D.I. to African countries. Besides, the G.D.P.
per capita of China has a significantly positive effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries. This indicates that one of the drivers of F.D.I. flow from China
to African countries is an increase in the economic potential and magnitude of
the Chinese economy.
The effect of diplomacy between China and African countries represented by
China’s voting alignment with African countries in the U.N. General Assembly and
recognition of the One-China policy has a robust positive effect on Chinese F.D.I.
flow to African countries. Therefore, the diplomatic relationship between China and
African countries plays a significant role in attracting Chinese F.D.I. because it
Table 1. The impacts of institutional quality and business environment on Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries.





















































































































Obs. 280 270 341 311
R2 0.873 0.898 0.856 0.873
Ramsey 0.259 0.136 0.140 0.079
Notes:  significant at 1%,  significant at 5%,  significant at 10%, standard error in parenthesis. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
34 D. G. BOROJO AND J. YUSHI
increases F.D.I. inflow by reducing barriers that may face Chinese investors in
African countries.
Chinese F.D.I., however, is not significantly affected by natural resources extrac-
tion. This is because of Chinese F.D.I. presents in a broad range of countries, includ-
ing non-resource-rich countries in East Africa such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania.
On top of that, sizable F.D.I. inflows from China to Africa are going into the services
sector, constituting more than 60%. This justification is true even in some oil-rich
African countries. The remaining part goes to the manufacturing, construction, and
natural resources sectors. Thus, against popular perception, most of the Chinese
F.D.I. inflow is not focusing on natural resources motives.
Turning to our explanatory variables of main interest, all institutional quality and
business environment indicators have expected signs and their effect is statistically
significant but the first indicators of border and transport efficiency and political
institution index. The coefficient of the business environment is negative and statistic-
ally significant, indicating that African countries with a conducive doing business
environment attract more F.D.I. from China. Similarly, there is a significant negative
association between border and transport efficiency indicator and Chinese F.D.I. flow
to African countries, indicating improvements in border and transport efficiency pro-
motes Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries.
Furthermore, the economic freedom indicator has a robust positive effect on
Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. Furthermore, the coefficient of polity vari-
able is significant at the conventional level, implying an improvement in democratic
institutions promotes Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries.
Since economic freedom indicators are significantly important, we aim to
examine the effect of each economic freedom indicator on Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries. We are interested in these indicators because it is believed that
institutional quality, more specifically economic institutions such as property
right and contract enforcement, profoundly matters for the attraction of F.D.I.
Thus, compared to political and democratic indicators, economic institutions are
more relevant to affect F.D.I. flow, more specifically, Chinese F.D.I. as China fol-
lows a noninterference policy. Hence in this part, we examine the effect of prop-
erty right, legal enforcement, sound money, freedom to trade internationally,
investment freedom, business regulation and government size on F.D.I. flow sep-
arately (Table 2).
The coefficients of property right and legal system are also positive and significant,
indicating that improvement in security of property rights and legal systems affects
Chinese F.D.I. flow positively. Hence Chinese F.D.I. is attracted to African countries
where the rule of law, security of property rights, an independent and unbiased judi-
ciary, and impartial and effective enforcement of the law are secured. Furthermore,
the effect of regulation and sound money is significantly positive. This reveals that
regulatory restraints that limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labour, and product
markets discourage F.D.I. inflow to African countries. Similarly, the absence of sound
money negatively affects Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. Therefore, a
secured property right and legal enforcement and noble regulatory environment drive
Chinese F.D.I. to African countries.
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5. Robustness check
According to some literature, there will be potential reverse causality between the
business environment and institutional quality indicators and F.D.I. Hence business
environment and institutional quality may not be determined exogenously; however,
it may depend on the type of law that rules the country, the legal origins, and the
level of economic development (Buchanan et al., 2012; Peres et al., 2018). If the busi-
ness environment and institutional indicators are potentially endogenous, it is essen-
tial to look for alternative methods that do not suffer from the same problem.
Therefore, to address the endogeneity concern we estimate instrumental variable
Table 2. The impacts of separate economic freedom indicators on Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa.





































































































































































































Obs. 311 247 286 294 297 295 297
R2 0.864 0.868 0.867 0.871 0.862 0.888 0.858
Ramsey 0.068 0.479 0.245 0.166 0.190 0.132 0.222
Notes:  significant at 1%,  significant at 5%,  significant at 10%, standard error in parenthesis. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
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(I.V.) using legal origin and the lagged values of independent variables as instruments
for each institutional quality and business environment variables because these varia-
bles are controlled separately to proxy institutional quality and business environment
of African countries (Buchanan et al., 2012; Peres et al., 2018). Countries with a
lighter regulatory environment will have a better institutional quality and business
environment. In our analysis we consider countries with French legal origin have
lower institutional quality and highly regulated business environment because it is
highly correlated with an excessive regulatory environment and may lead to lower
quality institutions, mainly when the French legal system was implemented in devel-
oping countries (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2002). However,
Table 3. The impacts of institutional quality and business environment on Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries.





















































































































Obs. 234 231 331 208
R2 0.71 0.711 0.718 0.678
Wald v2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wu–Hausman (p-value) 0.126 0.215 0.275 0.064
Notes:  significant at 1%,  significant at 5%,  significant at 10%, standard error in parenthesis. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
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common law (English origin) provides the next highest quality of law enforcement
and also the highest protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998).
We find almost the same results. The signs of coefficients and their level of signifi-
cance are almost the same except minor differences in the coefficients and signifi-
cance of real G.D.P. per capita, one-China recognition and credit to the private
sector. This may happen because of exogeneity for the business environment and
institutional quality indicators.
All indicators of business environment and institutional quality in Table 3 are
hardly affected, suggesting our findings are unlikely to suffer from serious reverse
causality problems. The signs of coefficients of our interest variables and their
Table 4. The impacts of separate economic freedom indicators on Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa.





































































































































































































Obs. 301 228 276 275 286 285 287
R2 0.739 0.7959 0.703 0.684 0.703 0.701 0.7
Wald v2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wu–Hausman (p-value 0.383 0.034 0.212 0.135 0.084 0.117 0.421
Notes:  significant at 1%,  significant at 5%,  significant at 10%, standard error in parenthesis. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
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significance are almost similar to our results in Table 1, proofing that there is no evi-
dence of the endogeneity problem. Furthermore, the Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity
indicates that there is no evidence of endogeneity as we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that specifies no existence of endogeneity, proving the existence of exogeneity.
Furthermore, we test the endogeneity issue for each economic freedom indicators
using the same instruments. The Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity in Table 4 shows
that there is no endogeneity problem.
The signs of coefficients of property right, legal enforcement, sound money, gov-
ernment size, investment freedom are consistent with the results in Table 2. Their
effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow is robust positive. However, the coefficient of inter-
national trade freedom turns to negative and significant. Hence I.V. results are almost
similar to our results in Table 2, confirming that there is no endogeneity problem.
6. Conclusion
This article examines the impact of institutional quality and business environment
indicators on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. Aggregate institutional quality
and business environment indicators are derived employing principal component ana-
lysis using different institutional quality and business environment indicators. These
aggregate indicators are economic and political institutions, doing business, border
and transport efficiency of African countries. We employ the P.P.M.L. gravity model
estimator which is robust to accommodate zero-valued observations and heterosce-
dasticity concerns. Furthermore, we conduct robustness check for endogeneity prob-
lem using I.V. controlling the legal origin and lagged values of the variables as
instruments for institutional quality and business environment indicators. As these
tests disclose our results are proven to be robust and do not suffer from reverse caus-
ality problem.
Controlling for different explanatory variables, our findings indicate that improve-
ment in institutional quality and business environment of African countries have a
significant positive effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. The coefficient
of doing business environment is negative and statistically significant, indicating
African countries with a conducive doing business environment attract more F.D.I.
from China. Similarly, there is a significant negative association between border and
transport efficiency and Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries, demonstrating
improvements in border and transport efficiency promotes Chinese F.D.I. flow to
African countries. Additionally, economic institutional indicators have a robust posi-
tive effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. Besides, the coefficient of pol-
ity variable is significant at the conventional level indicating improvement in political
and democratic institutions promotes Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of separate indicators of economic freedom
on Chinese F.D.I. flow because of economic freedom indicators such as property right
and contract enforcement, sound money and investment freedom. Our estimates
show that legal enforcement and property right have a robust positive effect on
Chinese F.D.I. flow to African countries. Hence Chinese F.D.I. is more attracted to
African countries where legal enforcement, security of property rights, an independent
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and unbiased judiciary are promoted. Also, business regulation and sound money have
a significant positive effect on Chinese F.D.I. flow to Africa. Therefore, regulatory
restraints that limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labour, and product markets
and the absence of sound money obstruct Chinese F.D.I. inflow to African countries.
Our results also reveal that population size has a robust positive effect on Chinese
F.D.I. flow to African countries. This implies that Chinese F.D.I. flow to African coun-
tries is motivated by market size as it delivers a large labour force and potential con-
sumer that can promote production. Besides, there is a strongly significant positive
association between Africa–China trade openness and Chinese F.D.I. flow to African
countries. However, the coefficients of natural resources are insignificant revealing that
Chinese F.D.I. flow is not tied with resources motives. Thus, against popular percep-
tion, most of the Chinese F.D.I. inflow is not primarily motivated by natural resources.
Moreover, internal economic growth of the Chinese economy and the diplomatic rela-
tionship between China and African countries significantly affect F.D.I. flow from
China to African countries. The debt per G.D.P. has a robust negative effect on
Chinese F.D.I. flow revealing African countries with higher debt-G.D.P. ratio likely
receive less Chinese F.D.I. compared to countries with lower debt per G.D.P.
To conclude, our results provide evidence that the business environment and insti-
tutional quality of African countries significantly matter for Chinese F.D.I. flow to
Africa. Hence to promote F.D.I. flow from China to Africa, it is significantly essential
to improve the quality of the domestic business environment and institutions of
African countries.
Notes
1. We replace the bilateral variable that accounts for F.D.I. flow cost (distance) by M.R.T. in
the model following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) methods BY indexing (i,b,c) for
reporters countries and (j,e,f) for partner country (China).
MRTlnXijt ¼ lnXijt-{
P







Where, X is bilateral variables accounting for bilateral F.D.I. flow costs, hi¼Yi/YT and
hj¼Yj/YT, Yi¼G.D.P.cit, YT¼G.D.P.cworld
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Appendix
The aggregate indicators in Table A2 are derived from 16 single variables using principal com-
ponent analysis that aim to reduce the dimensionality in data. It changes the data into new
aggregate variables. Each principal component is essentially the weighted average of the varia-
bles included. The eigenvalues are the variances of the principal components. The first princi-
pal component has the maximum variance for any of the combinations. Similarly, in all cases,
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (K.M.O.) of sampling adequacy is used to check for the
appropriateness of the P.C.A.
Table A1. Sources and definition of variables.
Variable Source Definition
FDIcit China Africa Research Initiative (2017) Chinese FDI to African countries
gdpcai World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Per capita GDP of African countries
popi CEPII (2015) The total population of the reporting country
gdpct World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Per capita GDP of China
disict CEPII (2015) The distance between the capitals
of African countries and China
UNVict Voeten, Strezhnev & Bailey (2009) The diplomatic relationship between
China and African countries
infit World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Infrastructure quality of African countries
naturalit World Bank 2017) W.D.I. database Natural resources depletion rate
credit World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Credit to the private sector
tradeict China Africa Research Initiative (2017) Africa–China Trade flow
ccit World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project Control of corruption
rlit World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project Rule of law
stabit World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project The absence of violence and instability
vait World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project Voice and accountability
rqit World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project Regulatory quality
geit World Bank (2017) W.G.I. project Government effectiveness
polityit Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2017) Regime authority to consolidated democracy
soundmoney Fraser Institute (2017) Sound money
regulation Fraser Institute (2017) market regulation
invfree Heritage Foundation (2017) Investment freedom index
propertyright Fraser Institute (2017) Property right
legelaenfo Fraser Institute (2017) Legal enforcement
tradeinter Fraser Institute (2017) Freedom of trade internationally
costs World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database The cost to start a business
coste World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database The cost to enforce the contract
costr World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database The cost to register property right
mcbussiness World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Minimum capital required to start the business
docim World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Document to import
docex World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Document to export
timport World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Time to import
texport World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Time to export
cexport World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Cost to export
cimport World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Cost to import
exdeptit World Bank (2017) W.D.I. database Dept/GDP of African countries
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Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 KMO
Document to import 0.299 0.615 0.537
Document to export 0.279 0.647 0.536
Time to import 0.469 0.078 0.695
Time to export 0.464 0.130 0.673
Cost to import 0.445 0.277 0.728
Cost to export 0.446 0.323 0.718
Overall KMO 0.664
Table A2. Principal component analysis.
(a) Doing business index
Component PC1 PC2
Eigenvalue 1.749 1.058
Variance Proportion 0.437 0.265
Cumulative Proportion 0.437 0.702
Eigenvectors
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 KMO
Minimum capital required to start the business 0.491 0.527 0.583
The cost to start the business 0.563 0.193 0.649
The cost to enforce the contract 0.586 0.197 0.605
The cost to register property right 0.314 0.804 0.49
Overall KMO 0.595






Variable Vector 1 KMO
Control corruption 0.428 0.926
Rule of law 0.448 0.850
Regulatory quality 0.435 0.883
Government effectiveness 0.433 0.872
Absence of political instability 0.368 0.883
Voice and accountability 0.322 0.904
Overall KMO 0.883
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table A3. African countries included in the sample.
Angola Guinea Nigeria
Benin Gambia, The Rwanda
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Sudan
Botswana Kenya Senegal
Ivory Coast Liberia Sierra Leone
Cameroon Libya Seychelles
Congo Republic Morocco Chad
Comoros Madagascar Togo
Cabo Verde Mali Tunisia
Djibouti Mozambique Tanzania
Algeria Mauritania Uganda




Figure A1. Distribution of Chinese F.D.I. in Africa (Million U.S.D.).
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